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Solidarity was one of the most massive social movements in history. 
It was also one of the most consequential because – as most observers 
agree – it was a key cause of state socialism’s downfall. Yet, it has not 
entered the pantheon of great movements that are commonly credited with 
changing the history of the twentieth century: the American civil right 
movement of the 1960s, Gandhi’s movement against the British Empire or 
the anti-apartheid mobilization orchestrated by the African National 
Congress. The end of communism is routinely associated with the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, not with the Polish upheaval. The Polish movement is poorly 
known in most countries, international (and domestic) celebrations of 
Solidarity are not as conspicuous as the celebrations of other major 
movements, and the Gdansk-born movement has not become a 
paradigmatic case studied in the literature on protest politics.1 
The major movements of the last decades have come to be 
associated with moral principles that offer the world innovative and 
powerful ways of conceptualizing and organizing the struggle for justice, 
equity, and freedom. Gandhi developed and propagated a practical 
philosophy of satyagraha (non-violent resistance), Martin Luther King led 
the movement that became emblematic of the struggles for civil rights, 
Mandela and Tutu (the leaders of the South African ANC) contributed to the 
dissemination of the philosophy of ubuntu, 2  the Dalai Lama travels the 
world to promote Buddhist compassion that underpins the movement for 
Tibetan autonomy/independence he leads. Lech Wałęsa, certainly a popular 
figure on the world stage, is not seen as a propagator of the potentially 
                                                          
1 In a recent article Meardi [Meardi, Guglielmo: “The Legacy of ‘Solidarity’: Class, Democracy, Culture 
and Subjectivity in the Polish Social Movement”. Social Movement Studies 4, 3 (December) 2005, pp. 261-80] 
reexamines the viability of Touraine’s conceptualization of Solidarity as movement organized around three 
principles: class, nation, and citizenship. 
2 On Ubuntu see Cornell, Drucilla: “A Call for a Nuanced Constitutional Jurisprudence: Ubuntu, dignity 
and reconciliation”. 19 SAPR/PL. 2004; and Swanson, Dalene: “Ubuntu: an African contribution to 
(re)search for/with ‘humble togetherness’”. Journal of Contemporary Issues in Education, Vol. 2, No 2  2007, 
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attractive philosophy encapsulated in the name of the movement he led, 
Solidarity. Why? 
The answer can be simple. In order to successfully promote a moral 
principle two conditions need to be met: (1) the principle needs to be 
clearly articulated in a variety of expertly crafted discourses, and (2) such 
discourses need to be disseminated in a coordinated and sustained fashion 
in as many symbolic vehicles as possible. The first task belongs to the 
intellectual, political, and artistic elites; the second to political entrepreneurs 
and social activists. 
There is no room here to present the intellectual and artistic efforts 
behind the global establishment of such principles as American civil rights, 
Indian satyagraha, South African ubuntu, or Tibetan (Buddhist) 
compassion. A systematic comparative research project on this issue awaits 
its author, but it would be easy to show that each of these principles has 
been subjected to much more extensive philosophical and artistic 
examination, elaboration, and amplification than Polish solidarity. 
During Solidarity’s heyday Father Tichner, the movement’s undisputed 
chief chaplain, offered a series of meditations on Solidarity/solidarity 3 that 
for some time seemed to be quite influential, at least in Poland. But his 
work has not been continued. Since 1989, remarkably little intellectual 
energy has been invested in the development of the principle of Solidarity, 
that enormously successful master frame of the movement that helped to 
bring down state socialism. Immediately following the collapse of the 
communist regime in Poland some activists of the Citizens’ Committees 
attempted to use this principle to develop a novel social philosophy 
centered on the idea of the “third way,” but their efforts faded away very 
fast. I am aware of only two major efforts to systematically elaborate 
solidarity as a philosophical concept. Arista Cirtautas wrote a fascinating 
treatise that links the ideals underpinning Polish dissident movements, 
particularly Solidarity, to the tradition built around the philosophy of natural 
rights and – most originally – to the humanist, Renaissance ideals of human 
dignity. 4   Wlodzimierz Wesolowski and Aneta Gawkowska showed the 
embeddedness of the values animating Polish dissidence – again with 
                                                          
3 Tischner, Józef: The Spirit of Solidarity. Harper and Row: San Francisco 1984. 
4 Cirtautas, Arista: The Polish Solidarity Movement: Revolution, Democracy and Natural Rights. Routledge: 
London 1997, p. 168. 
Solidarity being most prominent – in several trends of the Polish social and 
political philosophy dating back to the nineteenth century.5 
Short on systematic elaboration, the principle of solidarity has not 
been promoted beyond a group of devoted aficionados6 in any sustained 
fashion. Obviously, promotion is difficult if not impossible without a prior 
clear (philosophical or artistic) articulation and systematization. So, why has 
such potentially attractive symbolic capital, which could have been 
employed in international promotion of Polish post-communist successes, 
been wasted? The answer lies in the inability of the Polish elites and the 
population at large to formulate once and for all a clear and broadly 
accepted interpretation of the movement’s history, its heroes, and its most 
significant successes. Most importantly, as of 2014, there has been no 
agreement on how to remember the Round Table Agreements (arguably 
the movement’s most spectacular political success) and whether and how 
to celebrate its leader, Lech Wałęsa. By contrast, American debates over 
the commemoration of King, Tibetan discussions over the Dalai Lama, 
South African over Mandela, or Indian over Gandhi seem to be surrounded 
by less intense debates and controversies than the similar efforts to 
commemorate and celebrate Wałęsa’s leadership.7 
Let’s push this train of thought a step further. If the international 
promotion of solidarity (as a principle) and Solidarity (as a movement) has 
so far (2014) failed due to the Polish society’s inability to agree on how to 
remember and celebrate both, what accounts for this situation? The rest of 
this essay is a sketch of a possible answer. 
 
Mnemonic reconciliation and the democratic consolidation8 
                                                          
5 Wesołowski, Włodzimierz / Gawkowska, Aneta: “’Communitarian’ Motives in Polish Political Thought”. Polish 
Sociological Review, 1 (145) 2004, pp. 15-31; and Wesołowski, Włodzimierz / Gawkowska, Aneta: “Jednostka, 
wspolnota i solidarnosc: motywy komunitarne w polskiej mysli spoleczno-politycznej”. In: Kurczewska, Joanna / 
Tarkowska, Elzbieta (eds.): Spotkania z kultura. Antoninie Kloskowskiej w piata rocznice smierci. Instytut Studiow 
Politycznych PAN: Warszawa 2006, pp. 246-93 
6 See, The European Solidarity Center in Gdańsk (http://www.ecs.gda.pl) and a research collective at the 
Collegium Civitas in Warsaw (http://solidarnosc.collegium.edu.pl). Both institutions publish interesting 
studies and documentary evidence. 
7 But is important to note that even in “older” democracies, while the intensity of discursive struggles over 
the system’s symbolic foundations diminishes (see Brier 2009, p. 81), it is never fully extinguished. 
8 This section and several other fragments were first written together with Amy Linch. Here I have 
developed some of our ideas further and reorganized some of our original arguments. Our earlier 
common work was published as Kubik and Linch 2006 and in Linch and Kubik 2009. I want to thank Amy 
 
Why is it important to have the domain of national memory “ordered” 
and arranged around a more or less coherent and broadly shared vision of 
the collective past, particularly in a new or consolidating political regime? 
Why is such an arrangement important for democracy? 
Many scholars argue that there is a positive correlation between the 
depth of post-conflict reconciliation and the progress of democratic 
consolidation. The concept of reconciliation employed in the literature on 
transitions to democracy refers variously to the process through which a 
society emerges from civil conflict, the confrontation with the past within 
that process, and/or to the goals of social harmony, human rights, 
institutional legitimacy and socio-economic justice. As a key component of 
transitional justice, reconciliation is alternately denounced as a weak 
substitute for “true justice” or championed for eschewing vengeance and 
creating opportunities for social healing. 9  Its ambiguous referent and 
connotations of spiritual transformation is seen as a possible impediment to 
the consolidation of liberal democracy for some.10 For others, those very 
characteristics help heal fractured social bonds whose restoration is 
necessary to rebuild both legal and economic relationships within a 
community.11 There is, however, a third way of thinking about this issue: 
mutual reinforcement. Krygier and Czarnota argue that “dealing with the 
past as a constitutional question is a problem of creating social conditions 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
and my wife, Martha, for their editorial remarks. My further work on these issues was conducted with 
Michael Bernhard and a group of collagues. Their names and our results can be found in Bernhard and 
Kubik 2014. 
9  Tutu, Desmond: No Future Without Forgiveness. Doubleday: New York 1999; Minow, Martha: Between 
Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History After Genocide and Mass Violence. Beacon Press: Boston 1998; and 
Villa-Vicencio, Charles / Verwoerd, Wilhelm (eds.): Looking Back, Reaching Forward: Reflections on the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. University of Cape Town Press: Cape Town 2000. 
10 Ash, Timothy G.: “True Confessions”. New York Review of Books. July 17, 1997, pp.  33-38; Norval, Aletta: 
“Truth and Reconciliation: The Birth of the Present and the Reworking of History”. Journal of Southern 
African Studies, 25 (3) 1999, pp. 449-519; and Forsberg, Tuomas: “The Philosophy and Practice of Dealing with 
the Past: Some Conceptual and Normative Issues”. In: Biggar, Nigel. (ed.): Burying the Past Making Peace and 
Doing Justice after Civil Conflict. Georgetown University Press: Washington DC 2003. 
11 Shriver, Donald: “Where and When in Political Life is Justice Served by Forgiveness”. In: Biggar, N. (ed.): 
Burying the Past Making Peace and Doing Justice after Civil Conflict. Georgetown University Press: Washington 
DC 2003; Biggar, Nigel (ed.): Burying the Past Making Peace and Doing Justice after Civil Conflict. Georgetown 
University Press: Washington, DC 2003; Graybill, Lyn S.: Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Miracle or 
Model. Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder 2002; and Elshtain, Jean. B.: “The Hard Questions: True Confessions 
– The Moral and Political Wisdom of South Africa’s Truth Commission”. The New Republic, November 10, 1997. 
for the new socio-political order, as well as regenerating damaged moral 
bonds in the society [emphasis added – JK].”12 
The most comprehensive conceptualization of reconciliation regards it 
as a multi-level, multi-stage process that begins with the preconditions for 
institutional agreement, encompasses the agreement negotiations and 
implementation, and ends with its legacies, both cultural and institutional. 
Reconciliation is both the process of promoting social and political peace by 
channeling contention into representative institutions and an approach to 
the issues that stand in the way of peace and cooperation among the 
parties involved in the functioning of those institutions. It is about 
overcoming social and economic inequities engendered by the ancient 
regime, proposing new cultural scenarios, changing perceptions, and 
rebuilding damaged relations on all levels of society. It is further argued 
that such a repair is beneficial for the consolidation of democracy. 
Agreement among elites – arguably a necessary though insufficient 
step in reconciliation following a regime change – is predicated on their 
perceiving themselves as potential collaborators in bringing about peace 
rather than as enemies. 13  In the case of negotiated transition 
(transplacement – in Huntington’s terminology) amnesty is often 
recommended. Huntington advises: “If transformation or transplacement 
occurred, do not attempt to prosecute authoritarian officials for human 
rights violations. The political cost of such an effort will outweigh any moral 
gains.”14 The development and acceptance of a joint project designed to 
bridge the political and/or social divisions provides the preconditions for the 
development of trust and mutual accommodation among elites. But the 
change devised at the top must then be convincingly communicated to the 
society at large in order to generate support for the agreement. In short, a 
functioning democracy requires that the constituents represented by the 
elites who are party to the negotiations accept the new terms of 
                                                          
12 Krygier, Martin / Czarnota, Adam: “After Postcommunism: The Next Phase”. Annual Review of Law and 
Social Science, Vol. 2, December 2006, p. 327.  
13  Kriesberg, Louis: “Changing Forms of Coexistence”. In: Abu-Nimer, M. (ed.): Reconciliation, Justice and 
Coexistence, Theory and Practice. Lexington Books: Lanham, MD 2001; and Kennedy, Michael: Cultural 
Formations of Post-communism. Emancipation, Transition, Nation, and War. University of Minnesota Press: 
Minneapolis 2002. 
14  Huntington, Samuel: The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. University of 
Oklahoma Press: Norman 1991, p. 231. 
engagement and begin to establish working relationships with their former 
adversaries.15 
In other words, the speed and “quality” of democratic consolidation is 
thought to depend upon the willingness of people previously mobilized in 
conflict to accept new rules of engagement, rules that are often anathema 
to the identities and framing of issues that galvanized them in the first 
place. The newly formed representative institutions offer the promise of a 
less disruptive means of channeling political and social conflicts, but their 
legitimacy requires a realignment of loyalties, interests and – most 
importantly – understandings of political reality, including the cultural 
foundation of a common collective identity. Elshtain defines reconciliation 
as acknowledgement “that we are all enclosed in a single sociopolitical 
frame and enfolded within a common ethical-political horizon.” (1997) The 
formation of such “frame” or “horizon” is often coterminous with the 
establishment of a “nation” construed as a community founded on shared 
experiences conserved within a standardized set of narratives. The 
invocation or creation of a common symbolic frame (“nation”) within which 
people can collectively interpret their experience helps to reconcile the 
diverse and factious experiences of the past. But as most theorists agree, 
the construction of a coherent collective memory occurs through 
coordinated communication rather than a spontaneous “amalgamation” of 
private remembrances. 16  Therefore, culturally focused reconciliation 
projects that attempt to provide “closure” regarding the crimes of the past 
do not work particularly well if they are not sponsored by the state and 
place the burden of redress and remembrance on societal groups alone.17 
That is, for the process to be successful the “nation” must work in unison; 
factionalization thwarts the effort.18 
                                                          
15 Bloomfield, David / Barnes, Teresa / Huyse, Luc (eds.): Reconciliation after Violent Conflict. A Handbook. 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance: Stockholm 2003. (electronic version 
available at www.idea.int/publications/reconciliation/upload/reconciliation_full.pdf). 
16 Connerton, Paul: How Societies Remember. Cambridge University Press: New York 1989; Olick, Jeffrey: 
“Collective Memory: The Two Cultures”. Sociological Theory, 17, 3 (November) 1999, pp. 333-48; Olick, Jeffrey / 
Coughlin, Brenda: “The Politics of Regret: Analytical Frames”. In: Torpey, John. (ed.): Politics and the Past: On 
Repairing Historical Injustices. Rowman and Littlefield: Lanham, MD 2003. 
17  Kubik, Jan / Linch, Amy: “The Original Sin of Poland’s Third Republic: Discounting ‘Solidarity’ and its 
Consequences for Political Reconciliation”. Polish Sociological Review 153 (1) 2006, pp. 9-38. 
18  Bernhard, Michael / Kubik, Jan (eds.): Twenty Years after Communism: The Politics of Memory and 
Commemoration. Oxford University Press: New York 2014. 
A number of scholars have argued that reconciliation, so critical for 
building a (relatively) united national whole, must include developing a 
shared narrative regarding the past, a common collective memory. In a 
sense, the goal of narrative reconciliation (understood as a process) is 
mnemonic reconciliation. Both are achieved when members of previously 
contending groups can acknowledge the legitimacy of one another’s 
perspectives on their own experiences. 19  Time and coexistence are 
important factors in promoting narrative reconciliation according to some 
scholars,20 but perhaps even more important are the institutional channels 
through which stories of the past are told. Dwyer 21  cites the power of 
competing narratives of the past in the conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi. 
UNESCO’s creation of a history book to mediate the different versions of 
Burundi’s past that stoke the hatred between the two groups is a good 
example of a productive institutional intervention.  
Additionally, successful narrative reconciliation is to a large degree 
dependent upon the cooperation of the elites who are most invested in 
perpetuating attachment to exclusive narratives of the past among their 
constituents. The Spanish case is a rare example of coordinated effort 
among elites to exclude contentious issues from public debate and mobilize 
collective memory (of the civil war) as a deterrent to civil unrest. The king 
became a symbol of national reconciliation and in the years following 
Franco’s death popular pride in the creation of the Spanish democracy 
became a unifying source of national identity.22  Splits among elites and 
unresolved private grievances can pose obstacles to popular acceptance of 
a unifying narrative frame, as evidenced by the experiences of the southern 
cone countries of South America where the military blocked demands for 
accountability and truth by victims and human rights advocates. Political 
leaders argued that peace required putting aside principle driven politics. 
Ethical and ideological commitments were faulted for the collapse of 
                                                          
19 Torpey, John (ed.): Politics and the Past: On Repairing Historical Injustices. Rowman and Littlefield: Lanham, 
MD 2003; Bernhard and Kubik 2014. 
20 Kriesberg 2001; Huntington 1991, pp. 208-79; Sa’adah, Anne: Germany's Second Chance: Trust, Justice, and 
Democratization. Harvard University Press: Cambridge 1998.   
21 Dwyer, Susan. J.: “Reconciliation for Realists”. In: Prager, C. / Govier, T. (eds.): Dilemmas of Reconciliation. 
Wilfrid Laurier Press: Waterloo, ON 2003. 
22 Edles, Laura: Symbol and Ritual in the New Spain. The Transition to Democracy after Franco. Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge 1998; Aguilar, Pamela / Humlebæk, C.: “Collective Memory and National Identity 
in the Spanish Democracy. The Legacies of Francoism and the Civil War”. History and Memory: Studies in 
Representation of the Past. Vol. 14. 2002. 
democracy in the late 1960s and early 1970s and reconciliation was 
construed as moving forward by forgetting the past. In Chile the arrest of 
Pinochet brought polarizing “irruptions of memory” into the public sphere 
resurrecting the aborted public debate about both Pinochet’s crimes and 
the state of the country under Allende.23 In South Africa, on the other hand, 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) attempted to promote 
reconciliation by weaving a narrative of forgiveness from the suffering 
people experienced under the old regime. The TRC symbolically constructed 
the new nation as an ethical commitment to prevent the abuses of the old 
regime by creating a culture of human rights. It attempted to promote 
reconciliation on the societal level by framing the crimes of the past in 
terms of the unjust system rather than as the fault of individuals. The two 
years during which the crimes of the apartheid regime dominated public life 
helped to overcome the severe segregation of social memory among the 
black and white communities and provide a frame through which they could 
begin to understand a common future.24 
The discussion so far can be summarized as follows. There are 
several factors that shape the consolidation of democracy or the 
improvement of the quality of democracy; one of them is the formation and 
maintenance of mechanisms assuring the relatively amiable and “civil” 
relationships among various groups in the society and/or the formation of 
sufficiently high level of intra-societal trust. Furthermore, there is a positive 
relationship between the condition of collective memory on the one hand 
and the “civility” as well as the level of such trust on the other: the more 
harmonious the former, the higher the latter.25 
In other words, the achievement of a high level of political legitimacy 
and the development of a high level of the intra-societal trust depend on or 
at least are positively correlated with a state of collective memory that may 
                                                          
23 Wilde, Alexander: “Irruptions of Memory: Expressive Politics in Chile's Transition to Democracy”. Journal of 
Latin American Studies, 31, 2 (May) 1999, pp. 473-500. 
24 Asmal, Kader / Asmal, Louise / Roberts, Ronald S: Reconciliation through Truth. David Philip Publishers: Cape 
Town 1996; Gibson, James: Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile the Divided Nation? Russell Sage 
Foundation: New York 2004; Kraybill, Ron: “From Head to Heart: The Cycle of Reconciliation”. Conciliation 
Quarterly, 7, 4 (Fall) 1988; Krog, Antjie: Country of My Skull: Guilt, Sorrow, and the Limits of Forgiveness in the 
New South Africa. Times Books: New York 1999; Liatsos, Yianna: “Historical Catharsis and the Ethics of 
Remembering in the Post-Apartheid Novel”. Doctoral dissertation, Rutgers University 2005. 
25 Rothstein, Bo: “Trust, Social Dilemmas and Collective Memories”. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 12 (4) 2000, 
pp. 477-501. See also: Bloomfield, Barnes and Huyse, eds. 2003; de Brito et al 2001; Davis 2005; Gibson 
2004; Gready 2003; Hodgkin and Radstone 2003; Jelin 2003; Liatsos 2005; Torpey 2003; Wilde 1999.  
be called harmonious or unified. This condition can take several forms and 
can be achieved via several mechanisms. (Bernhard and Kubik 2014) For 
example, it can mean the creation of a situation in which (almost) all 
members of given society share the same set of memories that are 
additionally shaped in such a way that they improve the government’s 
legitimacy and/or contribute to the achievement of reconciliation. This is a 
situation of mnemonic hegemony. Often this condition is achieved through 
more or less coercive manipulation of cultural production. Another situation 
is the existence of several memory domains (or memory regimes) in a 
given society with a set of accepted rules that establish and regulate a 
peaceful co-existence of these domains (regimes). This is a condition of 
mnemonic pillarization with separate memory regimes sharing a minimal set 
of common mnemonic fundamentals. This is, in turn, conducive to 
mnemonic reconciliation. Without such reconciliation it is difficult to propose 
a national frame for considering a new polity’s identity and there is no 
integration of disparate trust networks.26 For example, it is often argued 
that a new state or political regime should be inaugurated through the 
establishment of a national narrative that explains the fundamental 
relationship among the people who comprise it, accounts for the suffering 
involved in its creation, and ultimately provides a basis for the 
establishment of standards of justice and fairness. 27  If this is not 
accomplished, people remain polarized and focused on their own elites, and 
the public realm remains divided. Or put differently, a society with a 
fractured collective memory (no single hegemonic collective memory, no 
mnemonic pillarization or no mnemonic reconciliation among competing 
memory regimes) will have a weakly legitimized political regime and low 
levels of social trust.28 
 
                                                          
26 See Tilly (2005, 2007) on the concept of trust networks. 
27 A broadly accepted generalization to be found in various theoretical works and more practice-oriented 
manuals, runs as follows: “A functioning democracy, then, is built on a dual foundation: a set of fair 
procedures for peacefully handling the issues that divide a society (the political and social structures of 
governance) and a set of working relationships between the groups involved” (Bloomfield, Barnes and 
Huyse, eds. 2003). See also: Tilly 2007. 
28 Political-cultural entrepreneurs in a country with a fractured collective memory may decide that this 
constitutes a problem – for example, for the system’s legitimacy – and can initiate cultural-political 
projects aimed at the achievement of some form of mnemonic hegemony or mnemonic reconciliation. It 
seems that non-democratic regimes will tend to prefer the former, while democracies have no choice but 
follow some version of the latter. 
Polish troubles with mnemonic reconciliation 
 
Poland emerged from communism as the country with the most 
distinguished history of anti-communist opposition and Poles can boast that 
they organized the most massive popular challenge communism ever faced 
– the Solidarity movement. The conditions for mnemonic reconciliation and 
thus successful cultural consolidation of the society can hardly be any 
better. Solidarity generated a rich and multifaceted lore of symbols, 
narratives, and (collective) memories. The post-communist order had a 
clearly defined founding moment: the Round Table Accords. It had at least 
one candidate for a great national hero: Lech Wałęsa. And it could easily 
add to the extensive list of the nation’s sacred spaces one more: the 
Gdańsk Shipyard. Yet neither a symbolic closure of the Round Table 
process nor broader mnemonic reconciliation has been achieved to date 
(2014). What happened? 
There is no room in a short essay to develop an exhaustive 
description and explanation of the failure to establish a common mnemonic 
regime that would strengthen democratic consolidation, facilitate the 
promotion of Poland (as “communism’s slayer”), establish Solidarity among 
the great movements of the twentieth century, and certify the movement’s 
authorship of an innovative moral principle. In a sketch of such an analysis 
I identify the relevant elements or dimensions of the past that potentially 
could become enshrined and celebrated in collective memory and juxtapose 
them with those that actually are the subject of mnemonic contests whose 
participants try to develop specific versions of national memory. A 
comparison of the potential set of elements to remember with the elements 
actually selected by political actors to build “histories” or “visions” of the 
past helps to identify the strategies involved in the politics of memory. 
Solidarity was such a complex and multi-layered phenomenon that it 
can be remembered in many different ways. To facilitate the examination of 
this complexity and to identify the dimensions of the Solidarity phenomenon 
that are relevant for the formation of collective memory (or legacy) I will try 
answer four questions: 
 Who is the audience evaluating a given legacy and its impact? 
 Which period of Solidarity’s existence should be 
remembered/studied as a legacy? 
 Can we identify different periods influenced differently by the 
legacies of Solidarity? 
 What areas of impact should be selected? 
The first question has an easy, simple answer: there are two basic 
audiences relevant for the mnemonic contests: domestic and international. 
Second, it is sufficient to investigate the legacies of two main periods of 
Solidarity’s existence: the so-called “first Solidarity” (August 1980 – 
December 1981) and the 1981-1989 period (Underground Solidarity and 
the Round Table negotiations). There are also two answers to the third 
question: each period of Solidarity’s existence influenced – albeit differently 
– both the decomposition of state socialism and the consolidation of 
democracy. Fourth, the areas of impact can be conveniently conceptualized 
using a minimum of tools provided by the classical social movement 
theory.29 Any movement (or protest activity) influences and is influenced 
by: (1) the political opportunity structure (POS), (2) organization of the 
societal forces opposing or counterbalancing the regime’s power, and (3) 
cultural framing of the political struggle. This set of distinctions is 
summarized in the following list: 
1.1. Two “audiences:” 
1.1.1. Domestic 
1.1.2. International 
1.2. Two legacies: 
1.2.1. Solidarity” (1980-81) 
1.2.2. “Second Solidarity” (1989) and the Round Table 
1.3. Two periods of impact: 
1.3.1. Short term (decomposition of communism) 
1.3.2. Long term (democratic consolidation) 
1.4. Three areas of impact (classical social movements theory): 
1.4.1. Political opportunity structure (POS) 
1.4.2. Organization 
1.4.3. Frames (ideas, ideology, culture) 
 
While Solidarity, particularly as a novel moral principle, has not 
become a focus of sustained studies or intense international moral debates, 
post-communist Poland does attract a great deal of attention from the 
                                                          
29 Tarrow, Sydney: Power in Movement. Second Edition. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1998; 
McAdam, Doug / McCarthy, John D. / Zald, Mayer. N. (eds.): Comparative Perspectives on Social 
Movements. Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framing. Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge 1996; McAdam, Doug / Tarrow, Sydney / Tilly, Charles: Dynamics of Contention. Cambridge 
University Press: New York 2001. 
international scholarly community. Foreign experts study both Polish 
accomplishments and tribulations in a variety of comparative projects and 
almost uniformly rank Poland as one of the greatest success stories in post-
communist Europe. The role of Poland as a pioneer and leader in the 
struggle against communism is broadly acknowledged and Solidarity is 
credited for its bravery and tenacity, as well as for its creative and skillful 
strategizing during the extremely difficult period of state socialism’s collapse 
and power transfer. Scholars count Polish economic reforms among the 
most successful in post-communist Europe and commend the stability of 
Polish democracy (despite some problems, such as low electoral turnouts 
and a relatively dysfunctional party system) and steadiness of its foreign 
policy. 
Yet many Poles – particularly a significant segment of the nation’s 
intellectual elite, particularly on the right – are critical of the political and 
social situation in the country. Many right-wing critics of the Polish post-
communist condition claim that the country is in bad shape and the reasons 
for that lie in a series of serious mistakes, if not outright malicious 
maneuvers, committed or orchestrated by a part of the elite that was in 
charge during the critical moment of power transfer. Often, the criticism is 
extended to the post-1989 period that is seen as a series of botched efforts 
to bring the ex-communists to justice and to build a polity truly reflecting 
the needs and desires of the Polish nation, defined according to the 
precepts of a rather narrow, exclusive formulation of Polish nationalism. 
Sometimes such criticisms are measured and focused on specific issues; 
sometimes they are total and indiscriminating.30 
Most foreign observers who care to follow the spectacle of historical 
revisionism that has erupted in Poland almost since 1989 are flabbergasted. 
They learn, usually with incredulity, that domestic revisionists often see the 
Polish Round Table as an act of treason and Lech Wałęsa as a treacherous 
communist agent. Recall that for most scholars and friends of Poland the 
Round Table is seen as a creative, path-breaking solution to an incredibly 
complex political standoff, while Wałęsa is celebrated as a tough, 
charismatic and effective popular political leader. Paradoxically, then, the 
                                                          
30 For the former see, for example, Śpiewak 2005; for the latter a group of publicists associated with Radio 
Maryja and the daily Nasz Dziennik. For a useful site that monitors Radio Maryja’s activities (including 
English language publications consult http://www.radiomaryja.pl.eu.org). For more radical criticisms of 
the post-1989 Republic see Legutko 2008 and Krasnodębski 2003. Wildstein offers a strong critical view 
(from the right) on the lack of decommunization or lustration (2000). 
informed international audience tends to consider Solidarity an 
exceptionally resourceful and heroic social movement (albeit not studied 
much) that is one of the reasons for Polish post-communist successes, 
while Poles are still trying to figure out how to commemorate and celebrate 
together the movement they once formed and ran so successfully. 
In the next two sections I identify the major elements of Solidarity’s 
legacy that hypothetically could or should be remembered collectively and 
celebrated. 
 
Legacies of the “first” Solidarity (August 1980 – December 1981)31 
 
The short-term impact of the “first” Solidarity on the decomposition of 
state socialism (1981-89) can be analyzed using the three broad categories 
introduced earlier. The Polish communists’ official recognition of Solidarity 
in the fall of 1980 changed the rules of the political game through which 
the Soviets dominated Eastern Europe after the Second World War. A 
massive organization, fully autonomous and free from communist control, 
was legally established and from that moment on the political strategies of 
all collective actors in Poland had to be recalculated. Moreover, the 
emergence of the movement and the system’s reaction to it within the 
Soviet Union indicated that state socialism was ready for some, albeit 
unspecified, quantum of reform. In the parlance of the political process 
theory of social movements, the political opportunity structure (POS) was 
redefined and at least partially opened in response to popular mobilization. 
In the organizational sphere, Solidarity’s innovations were as 
numerous as they were path breaking. First, Solidarity was a complex social 
entity that still defies easy conceptualization and generates interesting 
debates. (Meardi 2005) Arguably, the unorthodox social form of the 
movement – a cultural class as I labeled it 32  – was the source of its 
strength that proved impossible for the communists to crack. Second, 
despite many actual and potential cleavages, Solidarity remained united 
behind its leader, Lech Wałęsa, whose authority was unquestioned by the 
movement’s other underground leaders. A unique duumvirate emerged in 
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Bibliography). 
32 Kubik, Jan: The Power of Symbols against the Symbols of Power. The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State 
Socialism in Poland. The Penn State University Press: University Park 1994. 
which the underground leaders coordinated covert activities, while Wałęsa 
was active on the “surface.” This structure proved to be an exceptionally 
effective coordinating device during the difficult 1981-88 period. Third, the 
union that functioned as an organizational skeleton for a massive, multi-
layered network of cells, groups, allied organizations, social initiatives, etc. 
was able to cover the territory of the whole country. Fourth, the potentially 
over-centralized power of Wałęsa and the National Commission (KK) was 
effectively counterbalanced by decentralization, particularly at the regional 
level. Fifth, the standard principle according to which union activities are 
organized – the place of employment – was supplemented by the place of 
residence principle that allowed people in various locations to connect and 
build alternative communities and organize common actions. 
Solidarity’s unique genius resided particularly in the domain of culture 
(Kubik 1994). The Polish anticommunist “revolution” was a massive 
cultural-political phenomenon. No other East European country’s resistance 
movement came close to its breadth of social incorporation or the intensity 
of its conceptual and symbolic battle against communist authoritarianism. 
During the 1970s and early 1980s, a substantial number of people engaged 
in the formulation, development, and defense of a counter-hegemonic 
vision that de-legitimized the state-socialist system and, simultaneously, 
allowed these people to constitute themselves as an “oppositional” cultural-
class of Solidarity. The cultural frame that defined this class and held it 
together was built as a polar vision of “we/the people/Solidarity” versus 
“them/the authorities/communists.” This bi-polar conceptualization 
((di)vision) was not shared by everybody, yet it served as a mobilizing 
frame for the most active individuals and groups. It was powerful enough 
to “cover,” at least during the 1980-81 period, the ideological divisions 
within the mobilized public. This in turn, contributed to the movement’s 
staying power and its political effectiveness. 
The long-term impact of Solidarity (on the post-1989 period) has 
been no less spectacular, though it was most clearly felt during the early 
years of post-communist transformations. Poland entered post-communism 
with a level of popular mobilization that far surpassed that of any other 
post-communist country. This translated promptly into the formation of a 
deep (by comparison with other post-communist countries) counter-elite 
relatively well-prepared for the formidable and unprecedented task of 
taking power from the communists. It is one of the axioms of the post-
communist studies that the success of political and economic reforms is 
positively correlated with the strength and depth of the anti-communist 
opposition.33 Poland is the prime example of this regularity. Another long-
term effect of Solidarity’s first period of existence is the formation of a 
broadly based trade union that challenged the communist monopoly in the 
area of union organizing and eventually contributed to the pluralistic 
character of Poland’s labor union sector. Solidarity was the main vehicle of 
the anti-communist opposition before 1989, and, as our research shows, it 
became the dominant organizer of popular (including labor) protests in 
post-communist Poland.34 
Participation in Solidarity was so massive that the society 
accumulated considerable organizational capital, which proved to be 
particularly useful during the period of transfer of power (1989) and the 
early consolidation. Solidarity’s organization according to the territorial 
(place of residence) principle during the clandestine years allowed it to 
accomplish three feats: (1) organize as Citizens’ Committees and run an 
effective electoral campaign between the end of the Round Table 
negotiations (April 4, 1989) and the semi-free parliamentary elections of 
June 4, 1989, (2) prepare and implement far-reaching decentralization of 
the state administration, and (3) hold the unprecedented local elections 
conducted already in 1990 and won by the candidates supported by the 
movement. Citizens’ Committees, extremely effective as they were in 
harnessing social energy right after the fall of the old system, produced also 
an ideology whose legacy is dubious: the idea of the “third way” (between 
capitalism and socialism) that was never fruitfully applied and might have 
contributed to the delaying of the formation of an effective system of 
political parties. 
The long-term cultural legacy of Solidarity poses a paradoxical 
problem. The symbolic overheating was an extremely effective weapon 
during the years of struggle. It allowed the people to separate themselves 
from the party-state and helped them sustain mobilization throughout the 
difficult Martial Law period. But it also posed a potential danger to the new 
                                                          
33 Bunce, Valery: “The Political Economy of Postsocialism”. Slavic Review, 58, 4 (Winter) 1999, pp. 756-93; 
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political system. Democratic politics seem to be at their best when guided 
by the spirit of pragmatism and compromise. 
Twelve attributes of first Solidarity are summarized in Table 1. Each 
of them is a potential legacy that may or may not be cultivated in collective 
memory. 
 
Table 1: Attributes (potential legacies) of the first Solidarity (1980-81) 
 IMPACT ON POS ORGANIZATION FRAMES/CULTURE 
SHORT TERM 
(1980-89) 
1. The beginning 



















































11. An idea of 
the “third way” 



















Potential legacies of the underground Solidarity and the Round Table 
(December 1981 – June 1989) 
 
The short-term impact of this period and its crowning event – the 
Round Table negotiations – is nothing less than historic. The well-organized 
and steadfast resistance that Solidarity managed to put up after the 
communists delegalized it on December 13, 1981, was unprecedented and 
eventually brought Jaruzelski and his team to the negotiating table. There 
can be little doubt that this breakthrough development would not have 
been possible without a dramatic change in the external political 
opportunity structure brought about the elevation of Gorbachev to the 
position of supreme power in the Soviet Bloc and his subsequent 
rapprochement with Reagan, a steadfast supporter of Solidarity. But the 
nitty-gritty logistics of the unprecedented power transfer were in Polish 
hands and the pioneering experiences of the country’s elites set the 
strategic tone for the regime transformations in the whole region. The 
Polish communists suffered an embarrassing electoral defeat on June 4, 
1989 and the first non-communist government in this part of the world 
since the 1940s was formed on August 24, 1989. Other dominoes then 
began to fall, including the spectacular opening of several, practically 
uncontrolled crossings through the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989. The 
state socialist system in Central Europe ended. 
The early institutional landscape of Polish post-communist 
transformations was characterized by a unique innovation, later largely 
forgotten: the Citizens’ Committees. On December 18, 1988, when it was 
clear that the communists accepted negotiations with the opposition, 
Wałęsa officially convened the Citizens Committee of the Chairman of 
Solidarity. It was an elite group of intellectuals and activists, conceived 
mostly as an advisory board to the Chairman, but also as a shadow cabinet 
of sorts. After the communists agreed to hold semi-free elections to the 
Parliament, Solidarity’s leadership decided to form regional and local 
Citizens’ Committees (CCs) throughout the country in order to overcome 
the incumbent party-state’s tremendous advantage in resources and media 
access. Thousands of such committees that sprung up during the next two 
months prepared and ran Solidarity’s electoral campaign with the help of 
often improvised and homemade propaganda materials. The elections of 
June 4 were a stunning success for the just re-legalized movement and an 
unanticipated, thorough defeat of the communist bloc; Solidarity/CC 
candidates won all but one of the mandates they were allowed to contest. 
Thanks to the Citizens’ Committees Poland was the first post-
Communist country to introduce a dramatic devolution of power and far-
reaching reconstruction of local and regional administrations. Later, others 
followed, but again Poland was a pioneer. Due to the fact that Solidarity in 
the guise of Citizens’ Committees had its cells in all 2400 plus gminas 
(municipalities and communes), it immediately triggered political 
competition at all levels of the political system. Again, this helps to explain 
Poland’s later successes in developing independent, effective (certainly by 
regional standards), and often innovative local governance (despite 
corruption), whose effectiveness was recently demonstrated in a 
comprehensive comparative study.35 
Several studies of the 1981-1989 period in Poland concluded that the 
cultural vitality and political significance of the polar frame (Solidarity 
versus the party-state) during these years not only did not decline, but 
seems to have increased. Anna Uhlig, author of an excellent study of 
political symbolism of the 1980s, wrote: “after December 13, 1981 the 
opposition’s drive to make a distinction between ‘our Poland’ (the Solidarity 
Republic) from ‘their Poland’ (Polish People’s Republic) intensifies.”36 The 
events that helped the underground movement to cultivate this hegemonic 
polar cleavage included two papal visits, the murder of Father Jerzy 
Popiełuszko and the immediate emergence of his cult, countless street 
demonstrations and clashes with the police as well as large industrial strikes 
in 1988. Not everybody, of course, participated in this ongoing, political and 
symbolic confrontation with the regime, and not everybody accepted the 
polar vision of the conflict. In fact, the actual numbers of those who 
supported Solidarity kept declining throughout the 1980s and rebounded 
only after Solidarity’s spectacular electoral victory in 1989. Yet, the 
perception of the hegemonic conflict between “us” and “them” continued to 
                                                          
35 Trutkowski, Cezary: “Przemiany wspolnot lokalnych – spoleczny wymiar decentralizacji”. paper presented at the 
conference “Polska po 20 latach wolnosci”. Institute of Sociology, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, May 22-23, 
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36 Uhlig, Anna: W kregu symbolu. O polskiej kulturze politycznej lat osiemdziesiatych [Symbol’s circle. On the Polish 
political culture of the 1980s]. Uniwersytet Warszawski, Instytut Nauk Politycznych: Warsaw 1989, p. 61. 
be the most characteristic feature of Polish popular political culture. 
Jasiewicz and Adamski summarized a longitudinal study of Polish attitudes 
in the following fashion: “Spontaneous answers show that in 1988 
somewhat fewer respondents than in 1984 perceive the presence of conflict 
in Polish society, which is, however, noted by almost half the respondents. 
The great majority of those who perceive conflict define it as between the 
authorities and society.”37 It is therefore clear that during the waning years 
of state socialism in Poland (1976-1989), an extreme, bi-polar 
conceptualization of the public space (“us” versus “them”) was formed and 
became a crucial weapon in the “society’s” struggle against the unwanted 
regime. 
As the negotiations with the representatives of the regime began, the 
Solidarity activists still subscribed to this basic bi-polar image, but a picture 
of the “untouchable” enemy had to be partially replaced by a vision of an 
adversary-as-a-negotiating partner. Negotiations are impossible without a 
symbolic platform of commonality. To create such a platform, several 
principal actors engaged in discursive actions aimed at discharging 
potentially explosive historical memories. As Janusz Reykowski, a 
representative of the party-state at the Round Table, recalled: 
Another [condition of successful negotiations - JK] was the principle 
of not discussing symbolic problems. We were to solve the future, 
and avoid arguing about the past. We believed, and I think most of us 
agreed here, that if we started getting into discussions about the past 
wrongs, we wouldn’t accomplish anything. We had to accept the fact 
that we looked at different things from the past in different ways, and 
that we had different visions of various symbolic problems. There 
were situations when someone couldn’t help raising such a problem, 
and the emotions flared, but I think we were in solidarity trying to 
weaken these emotions during the negotiations.38 
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The logic of negotiating requires, however, that the construction of a 
common (symbolic) ground must be counterbalanced by the images of 
separateness. 39  Otherwise, the supporters of the negotiating team (its 
“base”) may conclude that their representatives are “selling out” and some 
critics of a dialogue have an easy task should they decide to develop a 
narrative of treason. As a result, an ambiguous, hazy picture of the elite 
replaces a crisp, bi-polar vision of the socio-political field; the previously 
totally separate elites are appearing as at least partially overlapping. With 
such ambiguous cultural baggage, Poland entered the period of democratic 
transformations. The complex symbolism of the 1998-89 negotiations has 
become the target of intense interpretive wars, with the Round Table 
construed variously as a symbol of: (1) victory, (2) murky compromise, or 
(3) outright failure. The main reason for this mnemonic chaos was the lack 
of a properly devised and staged ritual of closure cum purification that 
would simultaneously close the previous period and ceremoniously initiate 
the new one.40 It is easy to argue, however, that this was precisely the 
price that had to be paid for the pragmatic spirit of compromise that not 
only made the negotiations possible, but also set the tone for the 
subsequent political moves. As has been often observed, despite occasional 
“authoritarian” rhetorical flourishes, Polish democratic politics has remained 
remarkably sturdy for the last twenty years. Quite possibly the key reason 
for this institutional stability is the spirit and practice of compromise already 
demonstrated at the Round Table. (Kennedy 2002) 
This pragmatic attachment to democratic procedures has served 
Poland well. As all major democracy-monitoring organizations, such as the 
                                                          
39 Hall observed in his conversation with Castle (2003, p. 72): “The most important thing was that society, 
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Freedom House or the Bertlesman Index, conclude, Polish democracy has 
been one of the strongest in the region since 1989. It has provided a viable 
framework for the far-reaching economic reforms whose implementation 
was an urgent priority as early as 1988. 41  Polish politics, plagued by 
electoral and party volatility as well as passionate cultural wars, has shown 
remarkable institutional stability. But the price for this was the acceptance 
of ex-communists, in their redesigned institutional form, as legitimate 
participants in the game of democratic politics. 
The long-term cultural legacy of the Round Table – arguably the most 
consequential and controversial of all Solidarity legacies – has been shaped 
by the interpretation of the major strategic moves made by the Solidarity 
negotiators prior to, during, and right after the negotiations. The period 
from the inception of the Round Table negotiations to the formation of the 
Mazowiecki cabinet (February 6, 1989 - August 24, 1989) generated or 
exacerbated two powerful cultural-political cleavages. The first was 
between the symbolically important logic of confrontation that contributed 
to Solidarity’s staying power in the 1980s and the reasoned logic of 
compromise that made possible the peaceful systemic change. The second 
was between the logic of exclusion that brought the selected elites from 
both warring sides (self-appointed by some interpretations) to the Round 
Table process and the logic of inclusion that underlay persistent attempts 
by both groups of elites to stay in touch with their “bases.”42 
For any negotiations to be viable, the number of actors directly 
involved must be limited. Thus, the politics of exclusion (who gets in, who 
is left out, and who makes such decisions) comes to the fore. The logic 
behind the specific choices that produced “Wałęsa’s team,” which came to 
represent the “society” during the Round Table negotiations has become 
the subject of heated debates that cannot be analyzed here. Suffice it to 
note that “the excluded” engaged almost immediately in the critical double 
guessing of the negotiators’ motivations, as is invariably the case in such 
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situations. The critics offered two prominent critical discourses. Some 
argued that the compromises in the negotiations were unnecessary or ill-
conceived (Leszek Moczulski). Others contended that it was an imperfect 
though desirable method of dismantling the old system that opened up a 
whole new field of opportunities. For the latter group, the problem was the 
subsequent squandering of these opportunities (Wiesław Chrzanowski, 
Aleksander Hall). Moczulski developed a very complex, counterfactual vision 
of the various unrealized negotiating scenarios that were possible (in his 
mind) had Solidarity only waited a few more months. 43  He imagined a 
triangular table that included the Church as a fully-fledged third side rather 
than merely as mediator, or a square table where the radical, 
independence-oriented, opposition joined the other three for a negotiating 
table that covered a fuller spectrum of the salient political options of the 
time. In his story, communism was disintegrating due to a complex process 
in which Gorbachev played a prominent role. The main task for the Polish 
elites was to react properly to Soviet developments, where the causative 
agency ultimately lay. Unfortunately, the dominant Solidarity elites, because 
they were “politically, poorly prepared,” opted for the suboptimal strategy 
of premature negotiations at the Round Table. 
Chrzanowski’s and Hall’s vision was different; it had two important 
components. First, they regarded the composition of the “societal” side at 
the Round Table as incomplete. Among the important absent political 
options were those represented later by Chrzanowski’s ZChN, Dzielski’s 
“Thirteen,” and Macierewicz’s “Głos” milieu.44 Hall’s own “Movement of the 
Young Poland” and other (moderate) conservative circles were 
“insufficiently” represented (Chrzanowski Interview, p. 4). Second, the main 
strategic error came after Solidarity’s electoral victory on June 12, 1989. As 
Chrzanowski put it: 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall the opposition should have asserted 
that certain Round Table agreements were no longer valid. ‘Why is 
it so?’ Because [UNCLEAR], [in addition to – JK] pacta sunt 
servanda, that is “agreements entered into shall be kept,” there is 
another legal clause, rebus sic stantibus, that is, “provided the 
circumstances have not changed” (Chrzanowski Interview, p. 5). 
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In the opinion of this group of critics, the circumstances did change 
and after the elections Solidarity should have promptly conducted an 
ideological cleansing and eliminated former communists from public life 
much more vigorously than they actually did. Nonetheless, for both 
Chrzanowski and Hall the Round Table was unquestionably the right, 
“positive” strategic solution for that specific moment in time.45 
During the negotiations, both sides assumed that the “size” of their 
respective constituencies (“bases”) and the “depth” of their support were 
powerful bargaining chips. In order to strengthen their positions at the 
negotiating table both groups invested resources in creating and upholding 
an image of a “massive base.” As Jacek Kuroń, one of the “Solidarity” top 
leaders famously quipped: “We threatened each other with our bases” 
(Castle 2003, p. 73). “The Round Table talks were not only talks between 
the representatives of the opposition and the representatives of the 
authorities. They were also our talks with society,” observed Piotr Nowina-
Konopka, a Solidarity spokesman (Castle 2003, p. 69). But since 1989, a 
significant segment of the “society” has never felt “included.” Many activists 
and rank-and-file, drawn mostly from the “excluded,” bought into neither 
the logic of compromise nor the logic of inclusion, regarding the former as 
treason and the latter as a sham façade hiding the de facto exclusion of 
their representatives or most of the society from the Round Table deal. As 
they began politically mobilizing around these “revisionist” frames of 
interpretation, a powerful cleavage between “reformists” and 
“revolutionaries” opened in Solidarity, which until then had been remarkably 
united.46 This cleavage existed largely independently from the more obvious 
one that continued to separate the Solidarity camp and ex-communists. 
Both have remained salient throughout the last twenty years and still help 
to explain the basic maneuvers on the Polish political scene. Importantly 
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these two central cleavages in Polish politics have been more “cultural” 
than in other post-communist Central European states.47 They have their 
origin in the unrealized ritual closure of both the Round Table negotiations 
and the entire Polish People’s Republic (PRL) period. A properly staged 
ritual of closing and regime passage would – an anthropologist is tempted 
to argue – provide a common symbolic foundation for the new socio-
political order that had to be built in a society inevitably subjected to 
powerful centripetal forces generated by the costs of economic reforms and 
the re-birth of partisan politics. 
Quite a few politicians and activists have tried to shed the double 
legacy of the authoritarian politics of late communism and the 
extraordinary, liminal politics of the Round Table, but to no avail. Solidarity 
never ceremonialized its victory on a grand, nation-wide scale. 
Consequently, Poland entered a path of momentous transformations 
without a ceremonial closure of the communist period and without a 
ritualized inclusion of the “society” into the political process. The absence of 
a ceremonial rite of passage from “communism” to “post-communism” has 
had serious consequences for post-1989 public life in Poland.48 It may be 
the main cause of the symbolic/moral “disorder” or “malaise” that continues 
to show in various studies; it certainly has helped to generate one of the 
two dominant symbolic cleavages of Polish post-1989 politics. 
A very low level of trust in political parties and a relatively high level 
of protest politics (Ekiert and Kubik 1999) have characterized the post-1989 
public life in Poland. Again, the roots of this dissatisfaction with 
institutionalized politics may lie in the lack of a proper (ceremonialized?) 
closure of the Round Table process and the absence of a symbol or ritual 
signifying the birth of the post-communist Poland. The existing studies 
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leave no doubt that for those who negatively or critically evaluate the 
current situation of the country the Round Table symbolizes the beginning 
of the wrong path Poland has taken since the end of communism. In 
Chrzanowski’s words such people accept the “black legend” of the Round 
Table. Significantly, Chrzanowski suggested that the propagation of this 
legend is politically detrimental and contributes to apathy (Chrzanowski 
Interview Transcript, 9-10). Ireneusz Krzemiński observes perceptively: 
The moral acceptance of former adversaries [by a section of the 
Solidarity camp - JK], including the symbolic persona of general 
Jaruzelski, /.../ delineated the basic lines of political divisions, but first 
of all it generated unusually strong and emotionally laden moral 
divisions [original emphasis – JK]. A moral anathema has been 
imposed by both sides on each other. The symbolic representation of 
the society was destroyed and as a result a symbolic picture of the 
end of the old order and the beginning of the new order has not 
emerged. Such a symbol, that would dwell in the everyday 
consciousness and that would constitute a focal point for public 
rituals, practically does not exist; and yet it is sorely needed.49 
 
For those who tend to construe the post-communist reality in a manner 
described by Krzeminski, the Round Table compromise is not seen as an 
achievement, but rather as yet another example of the murky, if not 
outright malicious, wheeling and dealing behind the scenes that benefited 
only the elites of the “Reds” and “Pinks.” 50  In particular, they tend to 
reinterpret the maneuvers of Solidarity’s negotiating elite as having 
detrimental long-term consequences. The following table (Table 2) 
summarizes succinctly the two strategies of interpreting specific maneuvers 
employed by the Solidarity representatives during the Round Table 
negotiations. 
Table 2 
Maneuver by the 
Solidarity 
representatives at the 
Round Table 
Interpretation as a 
“virtue” by the 
supporters of the 
Round Table process 
Interpretation as a 
“vice” by critics 
                                                          
49 Krzemiński, Ireneusz: Moralne skutki transformacji ustrojowej (manuscript) 1999.  
50 With some exceptions, the “Pinks” are those members of the “Solidarity” elite who negotiated with the 
“Reds.” 
Compromise 
Talent for and 
openness to strategic 
learning 
The lack of “backbone” 
Positing modest goals 
Realism: 
incrementalism of steps 
and gradualism of 
goals 
Short-sightedness, 
cowardice, giving in 
Exclusion of the 
majority (and other 
options) from actual 
negotiating 
Technical imperative of 
negotiating 
Sectarian deal-making 
Lack of “accounting,” 




Protecting “dirty” gains 
 
 On the other hand, as Michael Kennedy argues at length (2002) the 
Round Table, properly “symbolically closed” or not, has provided Poland 
with a model that constitutes the cornerstone of the country’s robust 
parliamentary democracy and remarkably non-violent political practice. 51 
Hence, the ultimate paradox of the Round Table: the potentially explosive, 
deep cultural divisions engendered by the Round Table are routinely 
channeled through non-disruptive political mechanisms that also have their 
origins in the Round Table process, and – more broadly – in Solidarity’s 
non-violent ethos. 
If the lack of a ceremonial closure of the Round Table negotiations 
and the lack of a dramatically staged rite of passage from the Soviet-type 
Polish People’s Republic to a democratic Polish Republic help to perpetuate 
the peculiar “culturalization” and symbolic polarization of much of Polish 
politics, then a way out of this impasse may lie in the formation and 
maintenance of social/collective memory of negotiations that emphasizes 
reconciliation and defines a broadly accepted closure of state socialism. 
This, in turn, can be achieved through a successful ceremonialization of the 
Round Table reconciliation. Obviously, the staging of a relevant ceremony 
should have happened right after the 1989 transfer of power. A ceremony 
                                                          
51Zbigniew Janas emphasized this feature of the Round Table in his interview (Interview Transcript, 13). 
In Castle’s view this spirit and practice of compromise in the post-1989 Poland are “discredited” thus 
weak (2003, pp. 222-3). 
staged many years after the event to be ceremonialized would most likely 
lack the necessary cultural credibility. 
Ten features (potential legacies) of the complex socio-political 
phenomenon, called the “second” Solidarity, are listed in Table 3. 
Table 3: Ten attributes (potential legacies) of the second Solidarity 
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The politics of cultural choices 
 
My task in this part of this text is to shed some light on an empirical 
puzzle: the inability of the Polish elites to find a broadly acceptable 
ceremonial formula to “close” the period of communism and to establish a 
symbolic foundation for the post-communist order, despite the fact that the 
symbolic material for such an undertaking could not to have been better: a 
massive and successful social movement that generated an original and 
popular (sub)culture. The theory I work with holds that the regime 
consolidation, above all in the case of democracy, is positively influenced by 
mnemonic reconciliation (for more on this see Bernhard and Kubik 2014). 
The first task is to identify the potential “material” out of which 
legacies can be formed. Routine investigations start with cultural constructs 
that have been already fashioned as legacies and ask questions about 
them. My analysis begins with a strategy indebted to a well-known, prudent 
warning not to “select on the depended variable.” Accordingly, the bulk of 
this essay is devoted to identifying the key components of the phenomenon 
called Solidarity; they constitute the cultural material for legacy building. 
What remains to be done is to juxtapose the potential elements with those 
that were chosen to become actually existing legacies and identify the logic 
of cultural politics that drove such choices.52 
Through my analysis I identified twenty-two attributes of the 
movement that to the best of my judgment are “worthy” of collective 
remembering.53  It is an ensemble of disparate elements: some refer to 
actions, others denote actions’ consequences, and a few are attempts to 
label key components of the movement’s multifaceted “tenor.” Together 
they constitute a more or less “complete” potential legacy of Solidarity. 
Some of them have become subjects of academic and political debates and 
a small subset have been politicized as “active” elements of the emerging 
post-1989 Polish political culture. Obviously, some attributes of a movement 
have superior political potential and are therefore more likely to be 
                                                          
52 This type of analysis owes something both to the thinking in terms of counterfactuals (Fearon 1991) and 
to works on the politics of history investigating various usable pasts (Brubaker and Feischmidt 2002, p. 700-
1). I sketched a strategy for analyzing cultural legacies in Kubik 2003.  
53 The list and assessments are preliminary and arbitrary. A more precise analysis would have to be based on content 
analysis of (selected) narratives. It would be costly and time-consuming and it is not certain that it would be 
worthwhile. But without such a study the synthetic judgment on Solidarity’s legacies and their politicization must 
remain somewhat imprecise. 
politicized. The selection of Solidarity representatives for the Round Table 
negotiations and the assessment of the whole Round Table deal (see Table 
2) are good examples. 
Out of the twelve possible legacies of the first Solidarity three became 
central to the Polish post-communist political wars, generating questions 
and consequently powerful political cleavages: 
 Was Solidarity a pure, clear-cut challenge to communism or was it 
at least partially tainted by collaboration? In the context of this 
general question Wałęsa’s role is scrutinized: was he an 
unswerving hero or possibly a collaborator (even if for a short 
period of time)?  
 Was a deep, independent counter-elite formed? Or did the old elite 
(communists) and at least a part of the new one (Solidarity) 
collude to constitute what is sometimes portrayed as an unholy 
alliance of the “Reds” and “Pinks”? 
 Was the era of symbolic polarization of politics over in 1989 or did 
it continue because the foundations of the new republic had not 
been set properly? 
Among the ten legacies of the second Solidarity, at least three generated 
enduring questions and contributed to the saliency a major cultural-
political cleavage within the ex-Solidarity camp: 
 Was the Round Table the best method of ending communism or 
would communism have collapsed on its own (and would that have 
been “healthier”)? 
 Was the pragmatism of Wałęsa’s group a smart and necessary 
strategy or calculated “treason”? 
 Were the selection of the Solidarity representatives and their 
strategy at the Round Table negotiations optimal or were they 
calculated to preserve as much of the outgoing regime’s influence 
as possible? Did the choice of strategy protect the interests of the 
negotiating group rather than those of Solidarity or the society at 
large? 
The answers to these questions, provided by the critics of the post-
1989 republic and most of its governments, form a coherent narrative that 
can be summarized in five points: (1) the compromise at the Round Table 
went too far and/or the post-1989 governments have not done enough to 
undo its damaging effects once the ancient regime was irrevocably 
defeated; (2) as a result, the ex-communists have retained too much 
(particularly economic) power in the new system; (3) public life has not 
been sufficiently cleared of the people tainted by collaboration with the old 
system; and (4) an unholy alliance of the “Reds” and “Pinks” (ex-
communists and the “left” wing of the Solidarity movement) retained too 
much power for too long. The fifth critique is reserved for Lech Wałęsa. He 
is seen as pivotal figure who betrayed the movement (perhaps as early as 
the 1970s54) and presided over or at least contributed to the four failures 
listed above.55 
Effective as it was in mobilizing the political right, this narrative did 
not become hegemonic in the public space of the post-1989 Poland.56 It 
was always challenged by a competing narrative that focused on the 
successes of the 1989-2009 period and emphasized Solidarity’s 
achievements. What lessons can we draw from the analysis of this 
discursive confrontation? 
First, during the first twenty years of post-communist Poland, one of 
the dominant, if not the dominant, political cleavages was generated by 
symbolic or cultural wars. 
Second, in these wars only those elements of Solidarity’s “history” 
were unrelentingly politicized that: (1) were controversial ab initio and/or 
(2) were easily susceptible to diverging interpretations, and (3) had a 
strong potential to generate symbolically dazzling and politically 
advantageous cleavages.  
Third, almost none of Solidarity’s organizational innovations and 
strategic accomplishments in the areas of organizational innovation and 
policy making, such as the formation of Citizens’ Committees or the building 
of the territorial structure of the movement, became an active part of 
collective memory. 
Fourth, the intense politicization of the most controversial elements of 
Solidarity’s history was used as a political strategy largely by only one side 
of the political conflict: the right-wing critics of the post-communist 
                                                          
54 The biggest “scandal” related to Wałęsa was generated by Cenckiewicz and Gontarczyk 2008. 
55 For example, in a short video available on Youtube, an announcer proclaims while the camera shows 
the Gdansk shipyard: “This is where everything began. The former secret agent of the Security apparatus, 
Lech Wałęsa, code name ‘Bolek’ was made into a national hero by the mass media. Thanks to this, the 
Judeo-commune could fortify itself in a new form, democratically elected by the stupefied nation.” 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I-uho1f5ofc. 
56 Somewhat paradoxically this political option included most leaders of the post-1989 Solidarity trade 
union. On this topic see Brier 2009 and Ost 2005. 
transformations. Political strategists who chose this course must have 
decided that they wanted to engage their adversaries on the ground of 
cultural politics. Was, however, their cultural-symbolic political strategy 
effective? Did it produce desired “political goods,” such as popular support 
and thus power for the right wing parties, in particular for the Law and 
Justice Party, the most tenacious symbolic warrior? 
In a survey conducted in early October 2008,57 the leading polling 
organization, CBOS, found that Poles regard the post-1989 years as the 
best period in Polish history of the last one hundred years (49% of the 
respondents chose this option). The fall of communism was seen as the 
most important event in the last one hundred years of Polish history (21%), 
ahead of the election of Karol Wojtyla to the papacy (21%) and the 
regaining of independence in 1918 (20%). The creation of Solidarity in 
August 1980 was perceived as the most important event by 11% of the 
respondents. The ranking of Polish successes in the last one hundred years 
showed Solidarity in the sixth place: 
1. Regaining independence in 1918   52% 
2. Accession to the European Union   39% 
3. Liberation from communism in 1989  37% 
4. Rebuilding of the country after WWII  33% 
5. Armed struggle against Nazi Germany  25% 
6. Social movement Solidarity    22% 
Solidarity was enshrined in the collective memory, but many Poles regretted 
that its legacy was not more prominent in the nation’s post-communist 
culture. Consider the list of “Poland’s greatest weaknesses of the last one 
hundred years,” according to the same survey: 
1. Dependence on the Soviet Union after 1945  45% 
2. Wasting of Solidarity’s legacy    25% 
3. Poverty and social injustice in 
 the Second Republic [1918-1939 – JK]   24% 
4. Excessive influence of the Catholic Church  21% 
In early 2009 CBOS conducted a comprehensive survey asking its 
respondents to assess the twenty years of post-communist 
transformations.58 For a large plurality of the respondents (40%) the Round 
                                                          
57 “Spojrzenie na miniony wiek w historii Polski,” CBOS, Warszawa, November 2008, survey conducted on a 
random sample of 1107 adult Poles in October 3-7, 2008. 
58  CBOS, “Opinie i diagnozy 15: Dwadziescia lat przemian ustrojowych w Polsce.” Warsaw 2009. Various 
representative samples of adult Poles surveyed between January and May 2009. 
Table agreements were considered as the most important breakthrough 
event that marked the end of communism in Poland. Their evaluation of the 
agreements was largely positive: 41% assessed the agreements as “rather 
positive,” 12% as “rather negative,” 31% were “indifferent,” and for 16% it 
was “hard to say.” Importantly, 44% of the respondents saw the Round 
Table agreements as a “social contract,” while 26% construed it as an “elite 
deal.” For thirty percent it was “hard to say.” Criticism of the Round Table 
was most vividly reflected in the answer to the question whether it was the 
best method of regime change in Poland: 30% of the respondent thought 
so, but 37% thought the “the compromise went too far.” Only 8% claimed 
that it was “the wrong method, an unnecessary giving in to the 
communists.” The 25% of the respondents who admitted that it was “hard 
to say” were mostly too young to remember the event personally. 
The survey results reviewed here indicate that the impact of the 
mnemonic wars on public opinion did not produce the results desired by the 
chief instigator of such wars, the Law and Justice party. It managed neither 
to impose its vision of history on the populace at large, nor to achieve any 
enduring political success. After winning a plurality of votes in the October 
2005 Sejm (lower house) elections by a rather slim margin (27%, to Civic 
Platform’s 24.1%), it decisively lost in both the November 2007 (32.1%, to 
Civic Platform’s 41.5%) and October 2011 elections (29.89%, to Civic 
Platform’s 39.18%). 
In June 2009 Law and Justice was supported by 17% of the CBOS 
respondents, while its major rival, The Civic Platform, enjoyed the support 
of 38% of those polled.59 But the cultural clash Law and Justice ignited 
prevented the country from acquiring a standardized discourse on the most 
recent past that could be referred to by citizens attempting to assess the 
communist past, commemorate Solidarity, and locate a symbolic foundation 
for the new political order. By late 2013, the relentless promotion of the 
“anti-Round Table” vision of collective memory started generating political 
benefits: since August 2013 to the moment of this writing (December 
2013), the Civic Platform’s support was at the lowest point since its 
electoral success in 2011. Law and Justice continues to be its strongest 
opponent and the results of the next election are quite uncertain. 
                                                          
59 CBOS: “Preferencje partyjne w czerwcu 2009”.A study conducted between May 28 and June 2, 2009 on a 
representative sample of 1038 adult Poles. 
My closing argument is not purely analytical. It is hypothetical, as my 
points are difficult to substantiate given the state of our empirical 
knowledge. But it has solid grounding in the existing theories of symbolic 
politics and political legitimacy. I argue that the mythical realities generated 
by Law and Justice and supported by a minority of the population, 
contribute mightily to the formation of cultural chaos that manifests itself in 
at least four areas. 
First, a great opportunity to stage a ceremony that would initiate the 
new era right after the successful completion of the Round Table 
negotiations was squandered. There may be good political reasons 
(particularly uncertainty as to the Soviet reaction and the desire to respect 
the agreements with the communists) that such a ceremony was not 
staged; the symbolic logic, however, dictates that there is no better time 
for performing such ceremonies than the liminal phase, a phase in-
between, when the societal tolerance for changing the rules of the political 
game and proposing new interpretations of the collective past is particularly 
high60 and when a symbolic challenge to the previously dominant rules has 
a high probability of success. There could be no better liminal/liminoid 
period than that of late 1989 – early 1990.61  
Second, as national holidays have a very important function of 
generating the sense of community, the establishment of a common 
symbolic frame for collective memory calls for periodic re-enactments of the 
relevant ceremony, preferably in a calendar cycle (usually as an 
anniversary). As Zerubavel points out: 
The notion of a collective memory implies a past that is not only 
commonly shared but also jointly remembered (that is, “co-
memorated”). By helping ensure that an entire mnemonic community 
will come to remember its past together, as a group, society affects 
not only what and who we remember but also when we remember 
it.62 
                                                          
60 Turner, Victor: Dramas, Fields, Metaphors. Symbolic Action in Human Society. Cornell University Press: Ithaca 
1974.  
61 Turner introduced a distinction between liminal and liminoid phenomena. The former are “certain 
intervals of antistructure in simple societies;” the later are “antistructural moments in modern societies 
[that] are ultimately destructive of the normative order and are often the work of and in service of 
individuals (although they may have mass effects” (Wagner-Pacifici 1986, pp. 11-12). 
62 Zerubavel, Eviater: “Social Memories: Steps to a Sociology of the Past”. Qualitative Sociology. 19(3) (Fall) 
1996, pp. 283-300. 
 
Yet, mnemonic synchronization – as Zerubavel calls it – of the Polish 
national community did not rely on any symbolic markers (events, 
personalities or locations) related to Solidarity as late as the summer of 
2005. The founding events of the Third Republic made it into the 
ceremonial calendar of the new polity as state holidays only in July of that 
year, but even then not as a full-fledged holiday (a day without work).63 
Oddly, while the achievements of Solidarity and the Round Table were not 
enshrined in a uniform, “official” version of national memory for a long 
time, state functionaries showed several times during the post-1989 period 
that they did understand the significance of collective memory building by 
establishing several other holidays including staging the enormously 
elaborate Sixtieth Anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising in 2004.64 
Third, no founding myth of the Third Republic was proposed and 
popularly accepted. The Republic is an offspring of the Round Table 
agreements, but the meaning of the agreements did not cease to be an 
object of political-interpretive conflicts, such as that ignited by the League 
of Polish Families (LPR) in 2005.65 Without a modicum of agreement about 
the interpretation of this transforming political event, it is hard to imagine 
the formation of a commonly accepted founding myth of the new Republic. 
Poles seem to be attached to historical traditions more than many other 
nations;66 it is thus bewildering that both the Polish heroic contribution to 
the downfall of communism (Solidarity) and the peaceful manner of the 
conflict resolution (the Round Table) – often celebrated and highly valued 
                                                          
63 Dziennik Ustaw, 2005, 155, 1295 (July 27, 2005). As of August 2009, there were only four national 
holidays: (1) May 1 - Labor Day, (2) May 3 - anniversary of the 1791 constitution, (3) August 15 – Polish 
Army Holiday, and (4) November 11 - the National Independence Day. The latter is designed to celebrate 
regaining independence after 123 years of partitions. 
64 The November 11 Holiday was reestablished in 1989, the May 3 Holiday in 1990, and the Holiday of the 
Polish Army (August 15) – in 1992. 
65 According to Gazeta Wyborcza  06.13.05. (and other sources), Maciej Giertych, LPR’s candidate for 
president opined during his first electoral rally (June 11, 2005): “Już 16 lat rządzą na zmianę PZPR i KOR. 
Władze podają sobie z rąk do rąk.” (“The Polish United Worker’s Party and the Committee in Support of the 
Workers have already ruled Poland for 16 years. They pass power from one to the other.”) 
http://serwisy.gazeta.pl/kraj/1,34317,2763230.html. This framing belongs to a narrative that places 
power in Poland in the hands of the alliance between the “reds” and the “pinks.” For detailed analysis see 
Ekiert and Kubik 1999:164-71. 
66 Domański, Henryk: “Problemy wspólnoty a struktura społeczna [Problems of Community and the 
Social Structure]”. Res Publica Nowa. Warszawa 2004. (accessed June 17, 2005 at 
http://respublica.onet.pl/1838,dzial.html). 
around the world – were not turned into canonical components of the 
national tradition during the first twenty years of the Third Republic. 
Fourth, no attempt was made to stage a ceremony/ritual that would 
offer an official interpretation of the previous system and suggest an official 
frame for coming to terms with that system’s wrongdoings. The state never 
performed a public legal proceeding cum purification/healing ritual as the 
new South African state did through the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. It can be argued that Apartheid’s crimes were more severe 
than those of communism and that societal modes of seeking symbolic 
closure to a controversial past are as good as those conducted by the state. 
It may be that Polish state socialism was less oppressive than the South 
African “white” regime. The issue is not the actual intensity of wrongdoings 
but the lack of ceremonial accounting of those that occurred. The studies 
reviewed by Kubik and Linch (2006) argue that bottom-up, societal 
mechanisms are less effective than top-down state-led mechanisms when it 
comes to discharging the political potential of negative memories, the 
formation of a nation-wide symbolic frame for collective memory, and 
achieving mnemonic reconciliation. As of December 2014, the memory of 
the breakthrough 1980-89 period was not harnessed within a broadly 
acceptable interpretive frame that would facilitate mnemonic reconciliation; 
there was no “performance that would ultimately enable the state itself to 
function as a moral agent”67 and a definitive settling of accounts. 
Paradoxically, however, the prolonged cultural chaos and 
indeterminacy in the domain of collective memory may have not been as 
detrimental to the post-communist consolidation as the theory outlined 
earlier in the chapter predicts. Most importantly, during the first twenty 
years of the post-communist period, a solid dose of pragmatism became 
firmly institutionalized in Poland and formed a practical barrier that no 
major political figure has dared to cross, despite frequent “radical” 
rhetorical flourishes. Poles were increasingly satisfied with the post-
communist transformations: in December 1992, 49% believed that after 
1989 the situation in the country improved. In January 2009, 80% held this 
view.68 But the country entering the year of the 25th anniversary of the fall 
of communism as an undisputed leader of post-communist transformations 
                                                          
67  Borneman, John: Settling Accounts. Violence, Justice, and Accountability in Postsocialist Europe. Princeton 
University Press: Princeton 1997. 
68 Boguszewski, Rafał / Kuźmicz, Ewelina / Skrzeszewski, Michał: “Ocena Skutków Transformacji”. In: 
Dwadzieścia lat przemian ustrojowych w Polsce. Opinie i Diagnozy Nr 15. CBOS: Warsaw 2009, p. 67. 
has been unable to find a way to celebrate and promote the foundation of 
this success - Solidarity (Bernhard and Kubik 2014). The extensive and 
multifaceted symbolic capital the movement generated in the 1980s has 
been irrevocably wasted after the fall of communism. 
The country is politically and economically successful without 
mnemonic reconciliation. So, perhaps such reconciliation does not matter? 
Perhaps, but there is a nagging thought: the success could have been even 
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